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In the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah

IN THE MATTER OF THE ES'I1ATE OF
THOMAS FAIRCLOUGH PIERPONT, Deceased
TRACY-COLLINS TRUST COMPANY and
VILATE P. DEVINE,
.AJppellants,

CASE
NO. 9022

vs.
MARGUERITE

GESSFORD

PIERPONT,

and ELLA P. MEYER,

Respondents.

Brief of
Respondent, Marguerite Gessford p·ierpont
STATEMENT OF CASE
In lieu of unnecessarily repeating, the Statement orf
Case contained in Appellant's Brief at Pages 1 to 5 is incorporated herein and hereby refeiTed to in particularity.
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2
STATEMENT OF FACT

Also, to prevent repetition, fue Statement o[ Facts con.tained in Appellant's Brief at Pages 5 to 9 is incorporated
herein and referred to as being essentially correct togertJher
with the following ·~hanges and additions.
That the testator, Thomas Fairclough Pierpont, had
been ill, requiring major operations making him so he could
not speak and an invalid for a considocaJble time before he
made his Will on February 15, 1954, _and finally died on
September 14, 1954 (R. 98). That during this time, the
testator was :left to the sole care of his widow, Marguerite
Gessf1ord Pierpont,, who· constantly nursed and attended
him day and night and she, continuing~ as the private secretary (for many years past) of testator, assisted him with
his many and troub~ed business affairs (R. 369 to 371).
That testator intended to leave his widow financially independent, as is clearly manifested by the Will itself, in appreciation for her kind and faithful services and because
his said widow is not related to any of the other legatees
or heks of testa tor.
On October 7, 1954, the widow elected nQt to take the
monetary bequest of $20,000.00 provided by Paragraph
Eighth of the Will in lieu of the bequests and benefits of
Paragraphs Second and Seventh of said Will (R. 203, 214,
236-237, 333). The testator's Will was duly admitted to
prolbate October 22, 1954 (R. 23-29).

The Executor petitioned' for a family allOIWance (R. 73)
of, $250.00 per ·month .to reasonably maintain said widow
,-'

and her home in a proper manner aml this petition was approved without any. obj~tions December 17, 1954, even
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though apparently there were no "liquid' assets available
for suoh payment." (R. 95-96)
On December 23, 1954, the widow renounced her statutory share of her husband's estate and elected to take nn-

der the Will (R. 92).
The gross estate of decedent testate approximates onethird miHion dollars valuation, and the net estate after pay-

ment of all debts, taxes and eoopenses of administration
and all ·specific bequests and legacies other than to respondents herein was $158,339.22.

'Dhere has been no showing

at any time of any inrubility herein by the Executor-Trustee, Tracy-Collins Trust Company, to pay the annuities and
payments specified by the WilL On the contrary, the said
residue now consists of liquid assets and the Executor-Trustee has been aJble to collect accounts due and to borrow.
large sums of money ($70,000.00) at four to five percent
interest unsecured on the asssets of said estate and has
never been in danger of having

to sell or liquidate at a sac-

rifice any of the property of testator (R. 208-213, 297-305,
336).

That the Executor-Trustee has without right withheld
payments of the annuities to the widow, Marguerite Gessford Pierpont, ·and to the sister of testator, Ella P. Meyer,
and has caused the accrual 01f interest thereon without faul:t
of the annuitants even though the Court first interpreted
the Will as to the payment of sa1d annuities as early as
October 25, 1957, in favor of respondents herein (R. 319).
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4
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT 1
niAT IF THE COURT FINDS THE WILL AMBIGUOUS OR UNCERTAIN IN ITS TERMS OR MEANING,
~ENCE SHOULD BE ADDUCED TO SHOW THE

INTENTION OF TESTATOR.
POINT II
THE WILL SHOWS AN INTENTION THAT PAY·
MENTS UNDER SUBPARAGRAPH SEVENTH (i)
SHOULD COMMENCE FROM THE DATE OF DEATH
OF TESTAroR.
POINT III
THE WILL SHOWS THAT THE TESTATOR DID
NOT INTEND TO POSTPONE THE PAYMENTS PROVIDED UNDER SUBPARAGRAPH SEVENTH (i) UNTIL THE ESTATE WAS DISTRffiUTED TO THlE TRUSTEE.
POINT IV
THE PAYMENTS UND·ER SUBPARAGRAPH SEVENTH (i) OF THE WILL ARE ANNUITIES AND ARE

CONTROLLED BY SECTION 74-3-14, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953.
POINT V
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING THAT
INTEREST BE PAID TO RESPONDENTS ON THE
AMOUNTS DECREED TO BE DUE THEM.
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5
ARGUMENT

The whole problem in this case is typified by the meaning of the words "during her lifetime" in paragraph 7 (i)

referring to respondents, Marguerite Gessford Pierpont and
Ella P. Meyer. According to aJppellants, these words "during her lifetime" do not speak as of date of death of testator but rather are indicative to the trustee only to pay
such payments after the estate assets are physically delivered to the trustee. Not only this artifice is maintained,
but the trustee also claims that the testator only "desired"
certJain ;payments be made to his widow and sister during
their lifetimes and that therefore the trustee is not required
to make such payments if it should be against the discretion
of trustee to make such payments or to make up such payments if suspended. It should be remembered that the
Executor and Trustee herein are identical and that .the
claim of ina!bility to ·pay payments from the trust assets
until received by the trustee is a sham. The trustee is
maintaining in behalf of certain of the residuary legatees
against the specific annuitants receiving about three years
of monthly payments in the face of the obvious wording
and intent of the testator even though the,re are ample
funds available. If the trustee is correct, then the annuitants (respondents) could have been deprived of their payments for 5, 10, or more years merely by the device of failing to settle the estate and refusing indefinitely to transfer
on their books the assets from the Executor to the Trustee and insisting that the trust and Trustee were not yet
in existence. Certainly the widow, who had the elections
to not take under the Will or to take $20,000.00 cash in
lieu of other benefits, would not have been so anxious to
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make her election to take under the Will and .the ·trust
if she had known the contrary intent and arbitrary powers of "discretion" claimed by the Trustee herein in not
making the payments or in not making up suspended payments even when adequate funds are available and especially
when there is no showing by the Trustee of inability to get
funds to make such payments under paragraph 7 (i) -of the
Will and without "sacrificing" the estate as warned by the
testator in paragraph 7 (k).
The Will of testator manifestly provides first and foremost for the security and well-being of the widOtW. To
favor residuary legatees now as against the clear intent of
testator to give the widow $250.00 per month during her
lifetime is unconsciona!ble, especially where the· estate is
ample and should earn sufficient income on approximately
$150,000.00 principal to more than pay the annuities provided f()[' the widow ~and sister of testator. The decedent
knew the extent of his holdings and property and the extent or.f the charges to be made under his Will. He also
knew that his sister was aged and in poor health (R. 363)
and would not probably live much longer than the testatO[' himself. The widow W1ould be cut off from her annuity if she should re.Jmarry and therefore receive her support elsewhere or if she should take the $20,000.00 cash
under Baragmph Eighth. It is significant that paragraph
7 (i) instructs that the Trustee shall make disbursements
"From the income of the Trust Estate and, if insufficient,
from the principal thereof," indicating the full extent to
which the testator was willing to go to see that these monthly payments would be made. To adequately provide for
the .widoiW and sister for their dependent lifetimes was reasonably uppel'lmost in his n1ind.
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:famgraph 7 (k) is interesting for analysis. It provides that if income is insufficient and principal funds are
not available that the Trustee "may" reduce and if necessary "may suspend" further payments until funds become
available through income or through orderly sale. of all or
part of the principal assets, but in the event any payments
specified to be made by Trustee shall be so reduced or suspended, when funds become availaJble, any so resulting
deficiencies shall be made up. Also, the subparagraph pro- ·
vides that the Trustee shall not sacrifiice the assets for sale
"to meet the payments specified in this Will" but the Trustee is informed that principal assets should be Hquified to
ena!ble the Trustee "to make the payments specified hereunder." (Boldface ours.) Now any reasonable ·man would
know that monthly payments cannot be made if "income is
insufficient'' and ''principal funds are not available.'' But
how Trustee interprets this section to mean that just 'because the assets should not be sacrificed by Trustee gives
him the discretion not to make up the payments is. inoom:.
prehensible when more than adequate funds have become
available for making up such deficiencies. Can it be said
from the word·ing of this subpwagraph that the testator
intended that any so resulting deficiencies should not be
made up when funds beoame available? Certainly not.
The only purpose of the paragmph is to prevent a .sacrificing of assets. There is no language of aJbsolute direction in subparagraph 7 (k) eXJcept to possi:bly avoid sacIificing of assets. Nobody would want his estate sacrificed anyway, but this surely does not make the other statements of the subparagraph discretionary with the Trustee
c:.tmtrary to the voiced intention and desire of testator to
make up deficiencies when funds become available! In re
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Pittocks Will, 102 Ore. 159, 199 Pac. 633, cited by appel-

lants, was a case of directly contrasting language ill a di.:.
rection fu!llowed by a desire (the desire being ruled not mandatory) where in Pierpont's Will subparagraph _7- ·(k) _we
have permissions to reduce or suspend payments in emergencies and a desire to make up def.iciencies1 followed by
a direction not to sacrifice the estate. It is not the same!
Besides, in the Oregon case, the two instructions, one directory and the other requesting, were in conflict and detrimental to interests ·of the trustees -·as directors of the
Oregonian Publishing Company and ·would thus become
oontrary to intention of testator. There is no conflict in
7 (k) of Pierpont's Will neither is there any detriment suffered when the clear intention of testator is to make specified monthly payments to respondents and to make up any
emergency deficiencies when funds become availaf>Ie~
Some point has been made that the widow is getting
her family allO!Wance in addition to the claimed annuity
during her lifetime. It should be pointed out that a family allowance to a widow during administration is an absolute right-even where a portion of the estate has been
set aside as her share o[ the estate. See In re Pugsley,
27 Utah 489, 76 Pac. 560. See 74-3-3, U. C. A. 1953, which
treats a family allowance as a debt of administration and
a charge on the property of estate on a priority basis. Also
see 75-8-1, U. C. A. 1953, stating that a surviving wife is
entitled to such allowance out of the estate as may be necessary or reasonaJble fur support whioh may date from death
of decedent and is a preference to all other debts except
the last illness, funeral exJPense and expense of administration. The Pierpont WHl sets out the amount of the fam-
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ily allowance that is reasonable but it is a debt of administration and not a legacy or bequest as is the monthly annuity "during her lifetime." See also 74-2-6, U. C. A. 1953,
which states that a clear bequest cannot be changed by
inference or argument from another part of the will.
It should also be noticed tlha.t Paragraph Eig1hth of
said Will provides after the trust parngmph Seventh that
Marguerite Gessford Pierpont has the election to take a
cash bequest of $20,000.00 in lieu of any benefits under
paragraphs Second and Seventh and thus recognizes the
right of the widow to the family allowance of $250.00 per
month during administration provided in Paragraph Sixth.
Thus, the widow would have collected $20,000.00 cash and
her family allowance of $250.00 per month for three years
of administration in lieu of furniture, car and lifetime annuity. (She already. got the home on Shakespeare Avenue
by survivorship of a jbmt tenancy with deceased (R. 172).
The widow would have been entitled to her family allowance if she had elected not to take under the Will at all,
but she elected to take under the Will after her family allowance was ordered and she had to make her election in
this instance and under the Will provisions before distribution to the Trustee of the residue. Where is there anything in the Will to indicate that testator intended the widow not to have her annuity in addition to the family allowance? The widow is entitled to family allowance by
statute regardless of provisions of the Will, and she would
have been entitled to a widow's allowance even if the Will
had provided for none.
The sister, Ella P. Meyer, under paragraph 7 (i) is
to receive $100.00 per month during her UfeHme the same
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as the widow is to receive from income and principal, if
necessary, during her lifetime. $250.00 per month. The
wording _is .the same for botJh and should mean ·the same
for both. Where wording occurs more than once in a Will
it is presumed to have been used in the same sense and this
rule applies wi1Jh double force where the wording is fOund
in two ~sentences in immediate succession. In re MUrphy's
Estate, 99 Montana 114, 43 Pac. 2nd. 233. The widow and
sister should be treated alike in· both receiving their annuities from testator's death date as it 'is obvious the testator intended the sister to have the monthly income fur
the short time she might survive him and she is not pr<>vided any family allowance. It is interesting also to note
that testator provided that the monthly payment would
cease upon re-marriage of the widow. How could such
payments cease upon re-marriage during administration
if it were not intended that such- .payments should commence before distribution to the Trustee, namely, upon testator's date of death?
Also it is Interesting to note precatory language (and
the rule in re· Pittock's Will cited above by appellants) ofsubparagraphs 7 (i) and 7 (j) where 7 (i) and 7 (j) ·aresimilax in stating ''from income or principal" my Trustee,
"subject to the- provisions of subparagraph (k) of this
Paragraph Seventh," and are dissimilar in 7 (i) stating
"shall" made disbursements (of annuities) and 7 (j) saying "may" make disbursements for emergency needs of
certain hedrs. Applying the rule of Pittock's Will, paragraph 7 (i) is mandatory and 7 (j) is permissive or advisory.
Even ·allowing the interpretation of the wording of
the Will as presented by appellants, the application of the
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legal principles cited in the cases will not allOw· ·any practical outcome of this case different from the ruling Of the
lower court, as will be shown in the law cited in the following Podnts.
POINT 1
THAT IF THE OOURT FINDS THE WILL AMBIGUOUS OR UNCERTAIN IN·ITS TERMS-OR MEANING,
EVIDENCE SHOULD BE ADDUCED TO SHOW THE
INTENTION OF TESTATOR.
The Flndings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the
Judgment and Decree interpreting. said ··Will herein (R.
460-472) are based. upon the ruling in effect that evidence
as to testamentary intent would be admissible if at all only.
if the Will was ambiguous: and no ambiguity: was found
(R. 462, 469). If on this appeal it is determined that therer.
is ambiguity in the Will, the cause should be remanded for
the taking of evidence as to testamentary intent as offered·
by respondents (R. 369-371) and -Transcdpt of Proceedings
on June 30, 1958.

The respondent, Marguerite- Gessford Pierpont; -feels
1Jh:at the Will is dear and unambiguous and that -the intention· of testator was to pFovide ·a monthly annUity from the ·
date of testator's death. Mitchell v. Reeves, 196 A. 785
(Conn), 115 ALR 1114, holds: What a testator meant by
what he said, and not what he meant to say, is the ques.;
tion involved in interpreting a will. To the same effect
of construing a will according to legal effect of words used
is the case of In re Beal's Estate, 117 Utah 189, 214 Pac. ·
2nd 525.
When resort is had to written instrument alone, the·
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interpretation of the trial court, if reasolla!ble, will be accepted by the appellate Court, or if that interpretation is
one of two reasonable views, it will be follOIWed. In re
Platt's EstaJt:e, 21 Cal. 2nd. 343, 131 Pac. 2nd 825; In re
Northcutt's Estate, 16 Oal. 2nd 683, 107 Pac. 2nd 607.
POINT IT

THE WILL SHOWS AN INTENTION THAT PAYMENTS UNDER SUBPARAGRAPH SEVENTH (i)
SHOULD COMMENCE FROM THE DATE OF DEATH
OF TESTATOR.
The judgment appealed from awarded the $250.00
monthly installments of annuity to the widow, Marguerite
Gessford Pierpont, together with interest thereon until paid

for the period from September 14, 1954, w'hen testator died,
to October 18, 1957, when the residue of the estate was
distributed to the Trustee (R. 471) and said judgment awarded the sister, Ella P. Meyer, a similar judgment for her
said $100.00 monthly payments for said period of admindstration.
There is nothing difficult about this problem of when
the trust vests, especially when the Will. contains the period denoted for the payments to be paid "during her lifetime." Sec. 74-2-25, U. C. A. 1953, says: "Testamentary
dispositions, including devises and bequests to a person on
attaining majority, are presumed to vest at the testator's
death." The statute answers the question. A Utah case
on this statute also destroys in Utah the fiction of the separation between Executor and Trustee as to their powers
and duties-In re LoWe's Estate, 68 Utah 49, 249 Pac.
128. This case holds that a beneficiary with power to
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change trustee under Will is entitled to make such change
before distribution o[ the property to the Trustee from the
Executors. The appellant Trustee contended since it did
not have possession from distribution of the tTUSt property,
the testator could not have intended for the beneficiary to
have the power to substitute Trustee and require transfer
of trust property to new Trustee until distribution orf the
property from suoh Executors to the testamentary Trustee.
The court also held in the Lowe case that sinoe under
the statute (74-2-25 U.C.A. 1953) all testamentary dispositions are presumed to vest at the testator's death and
there was nothing in the Will to indicate an intention on the·
part of testatrix that the vesting orf the bequests and devises made therein should be postponed beyond her death,
that the Trustee should divest itself orf the title to the trust
property which testatrix knew would vest in her Trustee
at the moment of her death. And trns was true even thou~h
no distribution had been made from Executor to Trustee
and the wording of Will was that the testamenrtary Trustee
should transfer and convey all of such property at the time
in its Winds and possession to such other trust company as
her said ~daughter might designate in writing.
Title -under a testamentary ;trust vests as of the date·
of deaJth ·of testa tor and Trustee's title and thaJt of the
beneficiary vest as of that date, and a life tenant is therefore entitled to income from drute of dearth of testator as
an incident of that title. In re Hyland's Estate, 58 Cal. Aprp.
2nd 556, 137 Pac. 2nd 73, 75.
Where will created trust which gave income to ben~
ficiaries for life, beneficiaries were entitled to income from
the date of testator's death, notwithstanding fact that
trustees of such trust had not received the corpus from the
c
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executor till some time thereafter. In re Schiffman's Estate, 86 Cal. App. 2nd 638, 195 Pac. 2nd 484, 488.
In the absence of a provision in the will otherwise,
the legatee of a monthly annmrty was entitled to payments
from the date of death of the testator together wirth interest on all unpaid amounts from the date accrued. In re
Luckel's Estate, 151 Cal. App. 2nd 481, 312 Pac. 2nd 24, 31.

See also Sectioo. 234, comments a, b, e, f, and g, Reostatement of Trusts, 2nd, where beneficiary is entitled to
income from date of death of testator and this rule is applicable to trusts creaJted by residuary bequest and it is
Immaterial whether the same person is designated as executor and trustee.
In Pierpont's Will, not only is income given to the life
annuitants for disbursement thereof, but if income is insufficient to complete the payments, the corpus or principal shall be used when funds become available without
sacrificing said estate assets. A fortiori the payments
provided in Pierpont's Will are paya;ble from date of dearth
of testator. This is the only consistent view!point with the
use by testator of the phrases "during her lifetime."
In re Platt'·s Estate, cited supra, deals with .nearly all
of the problems concerned in this Pierpont Will and appeal
and this case follows the rule of the Restatement, Section
234, Trusts, also cited above. Platt holds that the trust
vests ·at testator's death. See also Estate of Hill, 149 Cal.
App. 2nd 779, 309 Pac. 2nd 39; and Estate of Dare, 196
Oal. 29, 35, 235 Pac. 725, where the allocation of income
is to be made by the trustee, not the executor, even though
they may be the same person. And see Will of S. C. Leitsch,
(Wise.) 201 N. W. 284, 37 A. L. R. 547, which states the
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greart: weight of authority that a bequest of a life estate
in a residuary fund, or some aliquot part theTeof, if no
fune is prescribed in the will for the commencement of the
interest or the enj~moort of the use or income of the residue, the legartee for life is entitled to the interest or income
. . . . . . . from the death of testator.
Starte Bank of Chicago vs. Gross, 344 Til. 512, 176 NE
739, 75 ALR 172, while holding payments'are due from date
of death of testator also holds that the executor may pay
these amounts directly to the booeficiaries without waiting
to transfer the residue or specifi.c fund to the trustee· and
thart for trustee to withhold payments until distvibution of
residue to trustee ''would be to enrich the residuary legatee by income from the trust fund whieh would not properly belong to the residuum of the estate·." Also, the creation of the trust is not "fixed by the time the executors
actually delivered the trust funds to the trustee, or, if executors and trustees were one, the time when they segr~
gated the trust funds or made appropriate entries on their
books."

POINT III
THE WILL SHOWS THAT TI:IE TESTATOR DID
NOT INTEND TO POSTPONE THE PAYMENTS PRDVIDED UNDER SUBPARAGRAPH SEVENTH (i) UN~
TIL THE ESTATE WAS DISTRIBUTED TO TH1E TRUSTEE.

The argument against paying the annuity to the -widow because she already got a family allowance has been
argued hereinabove. How about the sister who got nothing on her annuity for over three years? The trustee's
position is not fair and it is trying to act as sole judge a~
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to who is entitled to what payments under the Will and
is selfishly withholding from the chief beneficiaries the
residue for its own interests as Trustee and in favor of remaindermen all contrary to the e~licit wishes and intentions of testartor. In re Ferran's Estate, (Cal.) 248 Pac.
2nd 108, 112, holds tha!t if there is any doubt or uncertainty
about the intention of the settlor in a trust, it will be construed, if possible, in favor of the beneficiary and against
the trustee. This was a case where trustee did not invade principal of trust for beneficiary where income was
insufficient for her needs even where she had adequate
outside income and trustee had discretion to invade principal or not. "The mere fact that the trustee is given discretion does not authorize him to act beyond the bounds
of a reasonable judgment." "Whenever exercise of a trustee's discretion, absolute or otherwise, is challenged, the
basic inquiry is whether trustee acted in state of mind
contemplated by the settlor."
The way the appellants balloon the figures as to the
share of the widow and sister over a period of future years
(Appellants Brief Pg. 23 and 40) you would think they
resent these payments because it ·may deplete the estate
8.91% plus. Futurity means nothing for the sake of argument. The widow may re--marry or the widow a..'>ld sister may die. It is manifest, however thaJt if Trustee has
its unchecked "discretion" the widow would have been
farr better off to take her $20,000.00 and her widow's allowance rather than the annuity. The Trustee, should not
escape responsibility for withholding the annuity payments
and the accruing interest owing thereon. This situation
has been laTgely created by the Trustee and litigious heirs,
not the respondents herein. If a large unpaid sum builds
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up which may go to 'the heirs and representatives of annui-

tant, that is the fault of the Trustee for not paying the
sums to the widow and sister monthly as needed for their
maintainance and as intended by the testaJtor.

109 A.L.R. 717 et seq. states that where a monthly

or yeaTly installment is given

to a beneficiary, it is payable

out of principal even without a specific instruction to that
effect. When it is allowed specifically ourt of the principal,

it is in the nature of an annuity ·and is not a fluctuating

income from trust property and it will take precedenc~
over a residuary grant and must be paid even to the exhaustion of the trust fund.
A life tenant's right to annuity bequeathed to her under testamentary trust was cumulative even in years during which income from trust was insufficient to meet annuity in view of the fact that it was expressly pro\Tided in
will that any deticiency in trust inoome should rbe made up
out of principal. Caughy vs. Starte Deposit and Trust Co.,
196 Md. 252, 76 A. 2nd 323.
There is just nothing in the Will or in the law which
proVides for a .postponement of these monthly payments
to annuitants. All that is asked is 1Jhe unpaid amounts due
during probate ,as ordered and adjudged due to respondents
herein (R. 471). The income of the estate will 'more than
adequately carry these payments in the future and the
whole trust corpus and more will eventually be distributed
to the remaindermen.
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POINT IV
THE PAYMENTS UNDER SUBPARAGRAPH SEVENTH (i) OF THE WILL ARE ANNUITIES AND ARE
CONTROLLEID BY SECTION 74-3-14, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953.
This is a rewarding subject to discuss but tt is ridiculous for appellants to define annuities as they do using the
life insurance definition of annuity from Section 31-11-2,
U.C.A. 1953.
Our Utah Code classifies legacies in Section 74-3-1 and
in sub (3) thereof defines an annuity as a bequest of certain specified sums periodically. Certainly the periodic
sums specified lby Pierpont in his own woros to be paid
respondents during their lifetimes fit the Utah definition
of annuities.

Section 74-3-14, U.C.A. 1953, provides: "Legacies are
due and deliveraJble at the e~iration of one year after the
testator's decease. Annuities commence at the testator's
decease.''

Section 74-3-14, U.C.A. 1953, refers back to 74-3-1,
wherein all the kinds of legacies are defined and including
a legacy of annuity. Annuities then, commence at the testator's death but all other legacies are due and deliverable
at the expiration of one year afiter tihe testator's decease.
This is aJbsolutely compatible and explanatory of the phrase
employed 'by Testator "during her lifetime" with regard
to the payments to respondents in 7 (i) of the Will. The
position of the widow and sister then is in complete harmony with Utah statute law. (Even if appellants are correet that these are not annuities, the payments would then
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be general legacies- due one year after death

m decedent

and therefore two years before distribution of residue to·
Trustee where the Will does not state a contrary: time, for
commencement!!.)
In re Sears Estate, 18 Utah 19&, 55 Pac. 83;. holds that
payments reserved ~oc a surviving wife are annuities even;
though the· amount is. discretionary wiJth· the Trustee. ·The:
Court made an issue of rthe fuot that it was not discretionary fur Trustee to pay only a little to widow and~ as. much
as possible to other beneficiaries as the· TestaJtor had' provided for· his wife first .a.nd foremost. (That is really theobjection to: the Pierpont Will-tha:t the testator p:vovided'
for his- wife first and foremost!)
Black's Law Dictionary says an annuity is a legacy
payable by installments. 96 C.J.S. 547, Section: 1014 oo
Wills states that an installment oharge is an ·annuity, unless
it consists merely orf income from· a fund.
Section 902
Wills, 96 C.J.S. 351-352, states that a
gift. of an annuity constitutes a legacy or bequest and that
it may be subject to such limitations as the testatorr may
impose.
Let us again remember that the testator said the· payments were· to ibe disbursed monthly during the lifetime of
the widow and during the lifetime of the sister; He· did·
not say commencing three years after my decease or- when
the Executor gets around ,tJo transferring the trust assetsto the Trustee or when ~the books are brought up to date
and- changed from Executor to Trustee.
On Page· 36; of AppeUants' Brief tJhis ''sound discretion
of the Trustee" to·make up suspended payments has already'
been argued against, but it is indicative of the extreme to
which the Trustee resorts to have its own way and :rob

on
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present annuitants to favor remaindermen for selfish purposes, even when testator explicitly states they "shall be
made up". The Respondents have had to go to the Supreme Court to defend rtheir rights and have not brought
any suits against Trustee to force a sale of prineipal assets
in payment of annuities. 'Dhis is unnecessary now because
ample funds are availaJble to make up "such deficiencies"
created hy an over-reaching, capricious and arbitrary Trustee. It is such elementary law that personal representativ:es
of Respondents would succeed to large unpaid sums due them
under the Will that it will not even be discussed except to repeat that the Trustee caused such a situation against the
wishes of both Testator and Respondents. The Trustee was
amrply protected by two rulings of the lower Court on this
lawsuit but still persists in taxing and battling the heirs
and estate.
POINT V
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING THAT
INTEREST BE PAID TO RESPONDENTS ON THE
AMOUNTS DECREED TO BE DUE THEM.
The assets of the estate herein are substantial and the
desires of testator in paying of amounts due with interest
thereon can be carried out without harming the estate.
Again using statutory definitions, Section 74-3-15, U.
C.A. 195a provides: "Legacies bear interest from the time
when they are due ,and payable, except that legacies for
maintenance, or to the testator's widow, bear interest from
the testator's decease." This statute refers to previous sections 74-3-1 (classifying all legacies including annuities)
and 74-3-14 (stating commencing and due dates for legacies including annuities.) Annuities are due and payable
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cornmencing with tes'tartor's decease and thered:ore bear in~
terest f,rom testator's death date or when subsequently fall~
ing due. Also in this instance the monthly payments are for
maintenance and to the widow and hear interest from the
testator's decease.
Interest is a. part of or an accretion rto the legacy itself. In re Platt's Estate; In re Luckel's E-state, supra.
Where hav·e a testamentary trust to pay income to
successive beneficiaries, the fonner beneficia:ry is entirtled
to income from date of death otf testator and interest at the
legal rate thereon regardless wherther delay is due to fault
of Executor or not and whether or not same person is Executor and Trustee. Restatement orf Trusts 2nd, Section
234, oonunent e.
Matter of Biro's Will, 241 NY 184, 149 NE 827, holds
that interest is paya!ble on legacy otf income even where
legatee delays settlement by instituting suit ~contesting the
WilL A direction in the Will addressed to Trustee to pay
income of trust to legatee does not exonerate Executor
from paying income and interest thereon to the beneficiary.
CONCLUSION

That the Will of testator herein is clear and unambiguous ·showing an intent to provide annuities to re,spondents
from date of death of testator and the respondents are entitled to interest thereon from date otf accrual thereof as
provided mthe Findings and Judgment of lower Court (R.
460-472).
That this Court should find t!hat the Trustee has no
"sound discretion" to not make up such payments and has
exceeded its authority and breached the trust favoring the
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respondents pursuant to testator's Will. The great majority of the cases and law writers are against the position
of appellants.
Respectfully submitted,

MORGAN AND PAYNE,
Attorneys for Respondent,
Marguerite Gessford Pierpont
128 East Center Street,
Provo, Utah.
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